Communication in the boardroom by Adams, Renée
Communication   
in the Boardroom 
Renée B. AdAms
nO 61 — april 2008
a research report from swedish institute for financial researchSwedish Institute for Financial Research (SIFR) is an independent non-proﬁt organization
established atthe initiative ofmembers of the ﬁnancialindustry and actorsfrom the acad-
emic arena. SIFR was launched in January 2001 and is situated in the center of Stockholm.
Professor Magnus Dahlquist serves as director of the Institute. The mission of SIFR is to:
• Conductandstimulatehighqualityresearchonissuesinﬁnancialeconomics, where
there are promising prospects for practical applications,
• Disseminateresearchresultsthroughpublications, seminars, conferences, andother
meetings, and
• Establish a natural channel of communication about research issues in ﬁnance be-
tween the academic world and the ﬁnancial sector.
The activities of SIFR are supported by a foundation based on donations from Swedish
ﬁnancial institutions. Major donations have been made by: AFA, Alecta, Alfred Berg,
AMF Pension, Brummer & Partners, Carnegie, Handelsbanken, Kapitalmarknadsgrup-
pen, L¨ ansf¨ ors¨ akringar, Nordea, Svenska Fondhandlaref¨ oreningen, and ¨ Ostg¨ ota Enskilda
Bank.
In addition, SIFR is directly sponsored by some institutions. OMX funds research projects
and several positions at SIFR, inluding the Olof Stenhammar professorship in ﬁnancial
entreprenuership. Stockholm School of Economics funds two positions, and Sveriges
Riksbank funds a visiting professorship at SIFR.
SIFR alsogratefullyacknowledgesresearchgrantsreceivedfromStiftelsenBankforsknings-
institutet, F¨ oreningsbankens Forskningsstiftelse, Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stif-
telse, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Johan och Jakob S¨ oderbergs Stiftelse and Torsten och
Ragnar S¨ oderbergs Stiftelser.
Swedish Institute for Financial Research, Saltm¨ atargatan 19A 11, SE-113 59 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-8-728 51 20, Fax: +46-8-728 51 30, E-mail: info@sifr.org, Web: www.sifr.orgCommunication in the Boardroom
Ren´ ee B. Adams Communication in the boardroom
Renée B. Adams†
University of Queensland and ECGI
This version: March, 2008
Abstract
Communication is at the core of good governance, yet, because of data constraints, re-
search on boardroom communication is almost nonexistent. I examine communication in
the boardroom using a survey of the entire population of directors and CEOs of publicly-
traded ﬁrms in Sweden during 2006. The survey contained questions about information
exchange, debate, the directors’ relationship with management and directors’ roles and
was linked to ﬁrm and director characteristics. I received responses from 628 directors
and CEOs representing all but 12.59% of publicly-traded ﬁrms. Amongst others the data
suggests that a) directors vary in their perceptions of their roles and directors’ roles af-
fect their perceptions of communication, b) directors who agree more that they primarily
monitor management consistently perceive that they contribute less to boardroom dis-
cussion than directors who agree that the CEO often asks them for advice, c) directors
with a stronger personal relationship with management perceive their advisory role to be
more important, and d) directors on larger boards perceive that they contribute less to
boardroom discussions than directors on smaller boards. The results are robust to using
Heckman selection techniques to address sample selection bias. Overall, the data suggest
that monitoring alone may not be su!cient for good governance.
JEL classiﬁcation: G30; G34; J16
Keywords: Board of Directors; Board Eectiveness; Communication; Information; Sur-
vey Data.
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r.adams@business.uq.edu.au. Phone: +61-7-3365 7285. Indeed, to be a “director” is to “direct”–which means to become informed, participate, ask
questions, apply considered business judgment to matters brought before the board and, when
necessary, bring a matter to the board’s attention. (Committee on Corporate Laws’ Corporate
Director’s Guidebook, 2004, p. 7)
Getting information requires a trusting relationship with management. (Holmstrom, 2005,
p. 711)
1. Introduction
The prototype of an eective corporate board is an informed board that will argue with man-
agement when necessary. The now almost classic example of the detrimental impact a board
can have when it does not question management is the case of Enron. In its report on Enron’s
collapse, the US Senate argued that by not questioning management about the complicated
ﬁnancial transactions Enron was engaging in, the board had failed in its ﬁduciary duties to
shareholders. Yet, aside from such isolated cases we know little about whether it matters that
directors receive information from and question management and the factors aecting commu-
nication in the boardroom. The main reason is that it is di!cult to obtain data from board
meetings or observe boards “in action”. The empirical literature which uses measures of board
structure, such as CEO Chairman duality, board size and independence, etc. to proxy for board
eectiveness, provides only indirect evidence that suggests that communication may be impor-
tant. The literature examining the number of board meetings provides more direct evidence
that communication may be important (e.g. Vafeas, 1999), however, we still know little about
director interaction at those meetings.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze boardroom communication more directly than
publicly available data allows. In particular, I am interested in factors aecting how directors
“direct” in the sense of the ﬁrst quote above, whereby I focus on information-sharing and
directors’ willingness to disagree with management. To do this I surveyed the universe of
resident directors and CEOs (1,796 individuals) of publicly-traded ﬁrms in Sweden during 2006.
1Sweden is a useful laboratory for such a survey for several reasons. First, unlike in many other
countries, it is straightforward to identify and obtain characteristics of the entire population
of directors of publicly-traded corporations. Surveying all directors of publicly-traded ﬁrms
enables me to address concerns about sample selection bias. Second, the Swedish Statistics
Bureau, Statistics Sweden, regularly surveys Swedes on a wide variety of issues and maintains
databases of detailed information on individuals, including their income. This suggests that
Swedish directors might be more willing to provide information about themselves and respond to
a survey than directors in, for example, the US.1 Third, Swedish board structure has features
that closely resemble those of boards in sole board countries as in the US and UK, but it
also shares features with dual board structures as in Germany, for example, the presence of
representatives of major shareholders on the board. This means that the results can be of
interest to scholars of both the sole and dual board systems.
Boardroom communication has been the subject of heightened interest in recent theoretical
literature on boards. In part, this is due to a shift from the perception that boards serve
primarily to evaluate CEOs to a recognition that boards may also play a role in decision-making.
For example, the 1994 Corporate Director’s Guidebook of the American Bar Association (ABA)
deﬁnes directors’ duties in terms of oversight (Committee on Corporate Laws, 1994). The
2004, Corporate Directors’ Guidebook deﬁnes oversight more narrowly as monitoring of the
corporation’s business and aairs, and it explicitly recognizes decision-making as one of the
two basic functions of the board (Committee on Corporate Laws, 2004, p. 1). It suggests
t h a tt h er e a s o ni tb e l i e v e se ective involvement of directors in decision-making is important is
because it believes that the advice and counsel of directors can contribute to the corporation’s
success.2
In models in which directors’ main function is to determine whether the CEO should be ﬁred
1For example, Jonnergård, Kärreman and Svensson (2003) report a response rate of 66% in a survey of
directors and CEOs of 97 Swedish A-list publicly-traded ﬁrms in 1994 and a response rate of 50.8% in a survey
of directors and CEOs of 92 A-list Swedish publicly-traded ﬁrms in 1999. Since A-list ﬁrms are the largest ﬁrms,
these numbers suggest that Swedish directors are generally quite willing to respond to surveys.
2The courts have also acknowledged a separate decision-making function by ﬁnding directors liable for a
breach of their duty of care in the decision-making as opposed to the oversight area in some cases (Varallo and
Dreisbach, 1996, p. 34).
2(e.g. Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Warther, 1998; Almazan
and Suarez, 2003; Laux, 2006; Dominguez-Martinez, 2007), directors usually use publicly-
available performance signals to update their information. Although CEOs may manipulate
the information ﬂow (as in Dominguez-Martinez, 2007), these papers generally do not model
communication directly.3 As soon as boards play a more active role in governing, communication
between directors and the CEO becomes more important. In Adams and Ferreira (2007), this is
modeled explicitly. In their model, the CEO does not communicate with the board if it only has
a monitoring role. Only when the board has a value-enhancing advisory role does the CEO have
an incentive to share information with the board. In Song and Thakor (2005), the board also has
an advisory role which depends critically on information the CEO provides. Because the board
can also make decisions when in control in Harris and Raviv (2006), communication between
insiders and outsiders is important. Song and Thakor (2007) focus on another important aspect
of communication: disagreement between the CEO and the board. In their model, the CEO
dislikes excessive involvement by the board because it reduces his decision-making autonomy.4
Because of data availability, the empirical economics and ﬁnance literature has lagged behind
the theoretical literature in directly examining boardroom communication.5 The papers that
provide the most direct evidence on this issue are the papers examining determinants of the
number of board meetings. Vafeas (1999) ﬁnds, for example, that the number of board meetings
increases following poor performance. This suggests that board meetings play an important
governance role. Although examining the number of board meetings can shed some light on
communication, it does not provide a complete picture of director interaction because directors
may not attend all meetings. Even if they do, it is not clear that they participate in the
discussion. Ravina and Sapienza (2006) provides perhaps the most direct evidence suggesting
3An exception is Raheja (2005), in which boards primarily monitor projects and can block them. In her
model, outside directors use the promise of potential promotion as an incentive for insiders other than the CEO
to reveal information concerning project quality.
4Warther (1998) also models dissent, but in a voting framework rather than a communication framework.
5Boardroom communication has received more attention in the business literature. Mace (1986), Lorsch and
MacIver (1989) and Demb and Neubauer (1992) all provide interesting insights into communication. However,
since their evidence is interview-based, it is di!cult to determine what drives variation in communication.
Studies that use other methods in the management literature often focus primarily on the role of board diversity
on communication, e.g. Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999).
3that communication at board meetings is important. Ravina and Sapienza compare the trading
performance of outside and inside directors in the ﬁrm’s stock to determine whether outsiders
are relatively uninformed and when they appear to be more informed. They ﬁnd that the trading
performance of outsiders is better for committee members and directors with better attendance
at board meetings. This suggests that the communication that occurs in committees and at
board meetings leads directors to become more informed. My paper complements the prior
literature related to boardroom communication by using data that is not publicly-available to
analyze the eect of dierent factors on a variety of measures of boardroom communication.
Although survey data is rarely used in the ﬁnance literature, several recent studies using
surveys of CFOs by Graham and Harvey (2001; 2007) highlight that surveys can be a useful
tool to understand issues of interest to ﬁnancial economists that cannot be analyzed with
conventional data. Of course, survey data also has its problems in that it measures beliefs and
not actions, thus survey evidence must be interpreted with care. I return to this issue later
in the paper. Because surveys of directors in the ﬁnance literature are virtually nonexistent,
much of the analysis in this paper is exploratory in nature.
My survey instrument contained questions about information exchange, debate and the
directors’ relationship with management and was linked to director characteristics and ﬁrm
accounting data. In all, I received responses from 628 individuals (a response rate of 36.6%
from directors and 29.7% percent from CEOs) representing all but 36 (12.59%) of all publicly-
traded ﬁrms in 2005. The response rate is high, as compared to other surveys in the ﬁnance
literature,6 which helps to limit concerns about sample selection and nonresponse bias.
Ie x a m i n ef a c t o r sa ecting information-sharing and debate for directors. Because I have
data on the entire population of directors of publicly-traded ﬁrms, I am able to use Heckman
selection techniques to address the possibility of nonresponse bias. Amongst others, I draw
upon data I collected from the Swedish War Archives to help identify the Heckman regres-
sions. The data suggests that directors vary in their perceptions of their roles, communication,
6In comparison, Graham and Harvey (2001) had a response rate of 9% in their survey of CFOs of 4,440
ﬁrms.
4decision-making power and their relationship with management. Perhaps surprisingly, directors
generally agree that they receive su!cient information from management. Directors perceive
that they participate less in discussions and that their input is less valued on larger boards,
which is consistent with the idea that group size has an important impact on individual director
behavior (see e.g. Bainbridge, 2002).
On average directors agree more that they provide advice to the CEO and input into strategic
decision-making than evaluate management. Moreover, directors’ roles aect their perceptions
of communication. Directors who agree more that they primarily monitor management feel
that they participate less in boardroom discussions. Directors who feel that they often provide
advice to the CEO perceive themselves to be better informed by management and also perceive
themselves to be more active in board discussions. Directors with more board seats and directors
who are friends with the CEO perceive their role to be more advisory in nature. Consistent
with recent theoretical literature (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Song and Thakor, 2007), the
data suggests that boards that only monitor may not communicate well enough to be eective.
Instead, contrary to the common perception in the literature, personal ties between CEOs and
directors may add value, possibly because they help overcome the problem of gaining the trust
of executives that Holmstrom (2005) identiﬁes in the second quote above.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss board structure in Sweden. I
describe factors that the literature predicts should have an eect on communication in section
3. Section 4 discusses the survey and the data. I analyze the factors aecting communication
in Section 5. I discuss problems with survey data and address potential sample selection bias
in Section 6. I relate factors correlated with communication to ﬁrm performance in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes.
2. Board structure in Sweden
The mandate of Swedish boards closely resembles those of boards in the US and UK. According
to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (Code Group, 2005) the task of the board is to
5“manage the company’s aairs in such a way as to satisfy the owners that their interests in a
good long-term return on capital are being met in the best possible way.” The steps directors
can take to ensure they achieve their goal is very similar to lists of duties described by various
professional organizations in the US (see e.g. the Committee on Corporate Laws’ Corporate
Director’s Guidebook, 2004). Amongst others, directors must “pay attention to establishing the
overall goals for the company and deciding the company’s strategy for achieving these goals”
and “evaluate the company’s operative management on an ongoing basis and, if necessary,
appoint or dismiss the managing director” (Code Group, 2005, p. 25). As in the US, the
balance of power between the board and the CEO may vary across ﬁrms. For example, the
S w e d i s hG o v e r n a n c eC o d e( p . 1 5 )s t a t e st h a t“ T h eb o a r dm a ya l s od e c i d eo nm a t t e r st h a t
are part of the day-to-day management but must not intervene in the day-to-day operations
to such an extent that the managing director in reality may no longer be considered to have
that position.” Consistent with the description by Holmstrom (2005) of the management of
Coca-Cola and with theoretical arguments about unitary boards in Adams and Ferreira (2007)
and Song and Thakor (2007), this description suggests that excessive intervention by the board
may be detrimental.
The structure of Swedish boards is similar to those in the US and UK, with some exceptions.7
Unlike in the US or UK, no more than one person on a Swedish board can be a senior manager,
typically the CEO. In some cases, CEOs may not be formal members of the board. Unlike in the
US, the law requires that the Chairman and CEO positions are separated. As in the US, Swedish
boards have a nominating committee but this committee must have a majority of members
who are not board members. Because Swedish ownership structure is quite concentrated, it
is common for large shareholders to be represented on the board. The Swedish Governance
Code requires that a majority of directors are independent from management and at least
two directors are independent of the major shareholder (a shareholder with more than 10%
7Because of co-determination, employees have the right to appoint two representatives to the board of direc-
tors in companies with at least 25 employees and three representatives in companies with over 1000 employees.
However, employee representatives may never be in the majority on the board.
6ownership). However, because of the complicated nature of Swedish ownership structure,8 it is
much more di!cult to determine who is an independent director than in the US or UK. For
example, if directors have substantial business dealings with an “associated enterprise”, they
are no longer independent, but it is di!cult both to determine whether or not an enterprise is
“associated” on the basis of its ownership structure and to determine whether or not a director
has business dealings with the “associated enterprise”. Because formal independence need not
i m p l yt h a td i r e c t o r sa r ei n d e p e n d e n ti nt h es e n s et h eg o v e r n a n c el i t e r a t u r ec a r e sa b o u ta n y h o w ,
I circumvent this measurement problem by using the survey to help determine which directors
should not be considered “independent in spirit”.
3. Factors aecting communication
As the ﬁrst quote at the beginning of the introduction suggests, the active participation of
directors in discussions is key to good governance. Thus, it is important to understand which
factors aect the amount and quality of boardroom discussion. I focus on three sets of factors
that the governance literature relates, either directly or indirectly, to communication: the role
of the board, director characteristics and board structure.
Some of the assumptions underlying the recent theoretical board literature suggest that
the role the board plays may be a crucial factor in boardroom communication. In Adams
and Ferreira (2007), for example, communication of ﬁrm speciﬁc soft information between the
CEO and the board occurs only when the board has an advisory role. Communication is also
important in Song and Thakor (2006) in which the board also has an advisory role. Both these
papers suggest that there should be more communication, in the form of information-sharing,
when the board has an advisory role. Director characteristics may also aect their willingness to
participate in boardroom discussions. For example, directors with multiple board appointments
may have more experience and be more willing to voice their views. On the other hand,
directors with multiple board appointments may be spreading themselves too thin (e.g. Ferris,
8La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) provides a brief discussion of Swedish ownership structure
and illustrate the complexity of ownership using the famous example of ABB.
7Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003). If they are uninformed as a result, they may participate
less in discussions.
Board structure may also aect communication. For example, many have argued that when
the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board, he has too much power over the board meeting
agenda (see e.g. Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). Board Size may aect communication, if as
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue, large boards are less likely to hold candid discussions about
performance, or as Jensen (1993) argues, large boards are more easily controlled by the CEO
(see also the discussions in Yermack, 1996, and Bainbridge, 2002). Because CEO Chairman
duality is prohibited in Sweden, I cannot examine its eect on communication; however, I can
examine the eect of board size.
Holmstrom (2005) suggests that the balance of power between the CEO and directors can af-
fect communication. He argues that the board needs to gain the trust of executives to overcome
communication problems and that excessive board intervention will destroy this trust. Adams
and Ferreira (2007) provide a formal version of this argument. In their model, the CEO will not
communicate with a board that monitors too much. In Harris and Raviv (2006), the board is
more dependent on insiders’ information when it is in control. This suggests that the balance of
power will aect the role directors play. When the board is in control, the board may monitor
less to encourage communication. Thus, I examine the relationship between decision-making
power and communication indirectly by examining its eect on directors’ roles.
Finally, one of the most important assumptions of the governance literature is that in-
dependent directors are better monitors because they are more likely to question the CEO.
Thus, I examine the relationship between independence and communication by examining the
relationship between director independence and directors’ roles.9
9I also examined the direct eect of independence on my measures of communication. I ﬁnd that independent
directors are less likely to feel su!ciently informed by management, they are less likely to voice their views in
discussions and they feel their inputs into strategic decision-making are valued less by management. With few
other exceptions, the results were insigniﬁcant. I do not report them here, but they are available upon request.
84. Data
For the purposes of my study I require measures of communication that relate to directors’
tasks. I focus on the ﬁrst three aspects of communication the quote at the beginning of the
introduction emphasizes: information-sharing, participation and asking questions. Because it
is di!cult to measure whether directors are asking the right types of questions, i.e. tough
questions, I measure “asking questions” in terms of debate. My reasoning is that if directors
ask questions but this does not lead them to debate the issue at hand, then the questions were
not a challenge to management and should probably not be considered the type of questioning
that monitoring entails.
I also require measures of the board’s role, director characteristics, board structure and
decision-making power. I can obtain the number of board seats directors have and board size
from publicly-available sources. I measure the rest of the variables using survey questions. I
describe the survey I sent to directors below. Panel B of Table 2 indicates how I modiﬁed the
survey statements in the CEO survey.
4.1. The survey
There are virtually no surveys of directors in the ﬁnance literature, however, the management
and organizational literature contains numerous surveys of top management teams. I use two
papers from this literature as starting points for designing my survey. While both of these
papers focus speciﬁcally on top management team diversity, they contain survey questions that
are more broadly applicable and that seem suitable for my purposes. I complement these survey
questions with additional questions that are motivated by concerns in the governance literature,
for example, I ask directors to comment on whether they feel they receive enough information
from management.
94.1.1. Communication
Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) survey top management team members in 57 electronics
companies to assess the relationship between diversity and debate. They deﬁne debate to
be open discussion of dierences and the willingness of team members to advocate dierent
approaches. They asked respondents to consider a recent strategic decision that his or her
team made and to assess the level of debate concerning that decision using a Likert-type scale.
Because research in management suggests that team behavior is relatively stable over time, they
did not specify a particular decision in order to capture general patterns of team interaction.
They measured debate using the following four statements (p. 666):
1. In discussions of this issue, executives stated clear disagreement with each other.
2. Dierent executives proposed dierent approaches to the issue.
3. Executives openly challenged each other’s opinions.
4. Discussions of the issue became heated.
I followed their approach of asking directors to comment on a recent strategic decision using
a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), but I modiﬁed the statements
somewhat. I felt that the last question to a certain extent subsumed questions one and three, so
I only retained statements two and four. I also expanded statement two to determine whether
directors disagreed with the CEO or the major shareholder. Thus, I asked directors to rank
their agreement to the following four statements instead:
• Directors proposed dierent approaches to the issue.
• Directors proposed dierent approaches to the issue than the CEO.
• Directors proposed dierent approaches to the issue than the major shareholder.
• Discussions of the issue became heated.
10Because the literature identiﬁes the amount of information directors receive from manage-
ment as crucial to eective decision-making, I complemented these with the following statements
designed to capture information-sharing between the CEO and directors and individual director
participation when making this decision:
• I received su!cient information from management concerning the decision to be made.
• I voiced my views in the discussion.
Finally, although debate may occur in the boardroom it is possible that managers simply
ignore what directors are saying. Thus, I also asked directors to state their views on the impact
of their input by asking them to rank their agreement with the following two general statements:
• I feel that other board members value my inputs in board discussions.
• I feel that my inputs in formulating strategy are valued by management.
4.1.2. The role of the board
While the board may have more than two roles, I focus on the two most commonly described
in the theoretical literature, monitoring and advising. I consider the board’s monitoring role
to consist primarily in evaluating management because it is the monitoring function that is
emphasized the most in the governance literature (see e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). To
determine how directors themselves perceive their roles, I asked them to rank the extent of
their agreement with the following two statements:
• T h eC E Oo f t e na s k sm et op r o v i d ea d v i c ea n dc o u n s e l .
• I spend more time evaluating management than providing input into strategic decision-
making.
114.1.3. Inﬂuence over decision-making
Westphal and Milton (2000) surveyed outside directors of Forbes 500 ﬁrms to examine the
inﬂuence of minority directors on strategic decision-making of the board. They measure per-
ceived inﬂuence by asking directors to what extent they inﬂuence strategic decision-making
and conduct several tests that suggest that reported inﬂuence is a fairly good measure of actual
inﬂuence. I follow their approach and ask directors about their perceptions of inﬂuence by
asking them to rank their agreement to the following statements:
• In our company, management usually makes ﬁnal decisions on strategic issues.
• In our company, the board usually makes ﬁnal decisions on strategic issues.
• In our company, the major shareholder usually makes ﬁnal decisions on strategic issues.
4.1.4. Independence
As described above, it is di!cult to measure director independence in Sweden. One way to
obtain this information is to ask directors whether they are independent. However, this is
c o m p l i c a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ea r ed i erent deﬁnitions of independence. Directors may
be independent with respect to management but need not be independent with respect to the
major shareholder and vice versa, which makes formulating the question more complicated. In
addition, formal deﬁnitions of independence are often criticized because they do not rule out
personal relationships between directors and the CEO that may compromise their independence
of thought. Thus, instead of asking directors about their independence, I try to assess whether
they have such personal connections, and thus should not be considered completely independent
by asking them to rank their agreement with the following statement: “I am friends with the
CEO.” To assess their independence from the major shareholder and their personal relationship
with other board members, I also ask them to consider the following two statements: “I am
friends with the major shareholder” and “I am friends with most outside board members.”
124.2. Data description
I used MM Partner, a database containing names of board members of all public and pri-
vate ﬁrms in Sweden to identify the set of directors, CEOs and Vice-CEOs (the equivalent of
Presidents in a US ﬁrm) of all publicly-traded ﬁrms in Sweden in 2005. In 2005, there were
286 publicly-traded ﬁrms listed on the OMX (A&O list) and the NGM (Nordic Growth Mar-
ket). Including Vice-CEOs, these ﬁrms had 424 resident CEOs and 1372 resident nonexecutive
board members.10 I surveyed all board members and CEOs. Since some board members sat on
multiple publicly-traded boards, I asked them to respond to the survey for only one of these
directorships. I chose this directorship at random from the set of their publicly-traded direc-
torships. I also surveyed CEOs only in their capacity as CEOs, not as board members of other
ﬁrms. The entire survey contained a total of 86 questions to board members and 82 to CEOs,
of which the data in this paper comprise a subset. To increase the response rate, the survey
was mailed to the home addresses of each individual. In addition, I used the help of Statistics
Sweden to guarantee that the responses were anonymous. Recipients of the survey mailed their
responses to Statistics Sweden, which matched the responses to data on personal character-
istics on the basis of personal identifying numbers, but then removed all personal identifying
information.
To ensure that the Swedish questions reﬂected the meaning of the English questions, I had
the English survey translated into Swedish and then reverse translated into English. The ﬁrst
survey was sent out on July 14, 2006. I followed it up with two reminders. The last survey
response was received on November 11, 2006. In total, I received 502 responses (36.6%) from
board members and 126 responses (29.7%) from CEOs.11 I received at least one response from
directors and CEOs of all but 36 (12.59%) of the 286 ﬁrms. The number of responses per ﬁrm
with respondents varies from 1 to 8. Most respondents ﬁlled out the entire survey. Thus, I have
complete surveys for 409 board members and 107 CEOs. The number of observations for each
10I classify both CEOs and Vice-CEOs under the heading “CEOs”, because the distinction between the roles
is not always clear. For example, some ﬁrms only have a Vice-CEO. However, I also examine the impact of
Vice-CEOs separately when I analyze CEO responses.
1132 of the CEO respondents were Vice-CEOs, the rest were CEOs.
13question in this paper varies from 125 to 126 for the CEOs and from 485 to 500 for the board
members. Although the response rate is good compared to other surveys of top management
teams,12 a concern is that the responses may be biased because the length of the survey. For
example, it is possible that directors with more board seats, who may be busier, may not have
responded. I address this concern by applying Heckman selection models to individual director
responses in section 6.1. At the ﬁrm level, sample selection problems are less of a concern
because I have at least one response for most ﬁrms.
From MM Partner, I obtain information on the total number of board seats each director
has, board size, director age and tenure on the board for the entire population of directors and
CEOs. I also obtain information on ﬁrm size, as measured by the book value of assets, leverage
and operating performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA). Accounting information is
not available for all ﬁrms in the sample, thus the number of observations is reduced whenever
I include accounting information in the regressions.
4.3. Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 1A shows summary statistics for the sample of survey respondents and the
sample of nonrespondents. Panel B of Table 1A shows these same statistics for directors only.
Table 1B shows summary statistics for ﬁrms with at least one respondent and ﬁrms with
no respondent. On average respondents have 1.35 board seats with a maximum of 7. Only
21.02% of respondents and 13.15% of responding directors have more than one directorship in
another publicly-traded ﬁrm. This is only slightly lower than numbers reported for American
directors in a comprehensive sample of both large and small ﬁrms (e.g. Ferris, Jagannathan and
Pritchard, 2003). Of these, 15.61% hold more than one directorship and the average number
of directorships per outside director is 1.89 directorships. Board Size is also similar to numbers
reported for ﬁrms in the US. The average is 8 as compared to 7.5 directors reported in Linck,
Netter and Yang (2008). Although directors with more board seats are typically considered
very busy and might have been too time constrained to respond to the survey, directors who did
12For example, Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) report a response rate of 6%.
14not respond had roughly the same average number of board seats (1.24) as those responding
(1.36), probably because few directors hold multiple directorships. Although the dierences
between respondents and nonrespondents do not appear economically large, it is possible that
small dierences between respondents and nonrespondents could bias the results. I address this
issue in Section 6.1. Not surprisingly, ﬁrms with larger boards were more likely to have at least
one respondent.13 Of the ﬁrms with respondents, 77.27% have more than 2 respondents and
46.4% have a CEO who responded.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Table 2 shows summary statistics for all the survey items as well as variable names for the
survey items. Panel A contains summary statistics for the board members, Panel B contains
summary statistics for a variation of the director survey that I sent to CEOs. For each question
in panel A the minimum response is 1 and the maximum is 6. Thus, what is noticeable from
the summary statistics is that there is variation in the responses. On average directors agree
that they receive su!cient information from management (mean of 4.8) and they sometimes
perceive discussions to be heated (mean of 3.13). Interestingly, on average directors do not
consider their primary role to consist in evaluating management (the average response is 2.5).
Instead, directors also consider their role to be advisory in nature (mean response of 3.96). On
average, directors perceive the board to be the ﬁnal decision-maker (mean response of 4.95),
next come the large shareholders (mean response of 3.31) and last the CEO (2.92). Finally,
not all directors agree strongly that they are friends with the CEO (mean response 3.46) or the
major shareholder (mean response 3.34).
The CEO responses display a similar pattern, although, perhaps not surprisingly, CEOs
perceive the ﬁnal decision maker to be themselves ﬁrst, then the board and then the major
shareholder.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
13The dierences between characteristics of survey respondents and nonrespondents are all signiﬁcant at
greater than the 1% level. The only signiﬁcant dierences between ﬁrm characteristics with and without
respondents are those for Board Size and Ln(Assets) (both at the 5% level).
155. Communication in the boardroom
5.1. Factors aecting communication
In this section, I examine the relationship between factors that the literature argues should
aect communication and the survey items using directors’ survey responses. I analyze CEO
responses in Section 6.2. I ﬁrst analyze the survey responses that describe whether meaningful
communication exists between directors and the CEO. I consider communication to be mean-
ingful if directors feel they have received su!cient information, they participate in discussions
and they feel that other members of the board value their input. Thus, the set of dependent
variables Meaningful Communication contains the following items: Su!cient Information, Voice
Views, Value My Inputs and CEO Values My Inputs. In addition, I aggregate the information
contained in these 4 survey items into an index, Meaningful Communication Index, which is
the director-level sum of the scores for these 4 items.
Next I examine survey responses related to debate. The set of dependent variables contained
in Debate are those based on Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999), i.e. Dierent Approaches,
Dierent to CEO, Dierent to Major Shareholder and Heated Discussion. Consistent with
Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) approach, I also aggregate the 4 items into a Debate Index.14
One dierence between the items contained in Meaningful Communication and Debate is
that the items in the former refer to directors themselves, while those in the latter refer to the
board as a whole. Thus, I analyze the former primarily at the individual level, but analyze the
latter at both the individual and the board or ﬁrm level. Because the individual level survey
responses are ordinal, I analyze them using ordered logit analysis. Results of OLS regressions
are qualitatively similar.
The main explanatory variables are the factors the literature suggests should be related
to boardroom communication, namely the survey items describing directors’ roles, Number of
14I deﬁne the indices to be missing if more than 2 out of the 4 components were missing. The mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum of Meaningful Communication Index are 19.397, 3.224, 4 and 24. The mean,
standard deviation, minimum and maximum of Debate Index are 13.759, 5.047, 4 and 24.
16Directorships and Board Size. As control variables, I include Director Age, Director Tenure,
Ln(Assets), as a proxy for ﬁrm size, and Leverage. Although the answers to the questions
concerning directors’ roles, “The CEO often asks me to provide advice and counsel” (Advisory
Role) and “I spend more time evaluating management performance than providing input into
strategic decision-making” (Monitoring Role) are negatively correlated (correlation of -0.1071
which is signiﬁcant at the 1.69% level), the correlation is not too low. Thus, although directors
appear to perceive some substitution between providing advice and evaluating management,
there is little reason to be concerned about multicollinearity between these two items.15 In
addition, this is consistent with the idea that directors may perform a dual role on the board
acting as both monitors and advisors to management. Since the number of observations is
reduced when I include ﬁrm-level controls, I show each speciﬁcation both with and without
ﬁrm-level controls. Because the average number of respondents per ﬁrm is 2.5, which could lead
responses across directors to be correlated, I correct all standard errors for group correlation at
the ﬁrm level and for potential heteroskedasticity.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
Table 3 shows the results for Meaningful Communication in the director level sample. The
coe!cient on Advisory Role is positive and highly signiﬁcant across all columns. This is con-
sistent with the theoretical literature that suggests that directors and the CEO communicate
more when directors have an advisory role. Monitoring Role is generally negatively related to
Meaningful Communication. Thus, directors who agree more strongly that they evaluate man-
agement perceive that they participate less and that their inputs are less valued by the other
directors and management. Number of Directorships is generally insigniﬁcant but directors
with more directorships perceive themselves to be more active in discussions. Directors with
more board seats may be more experienced and thus more willing to speak their minds. Board
Size generally has a detrimental eect on Meaningful Communication. The larger the board,
the less directors participate, and the less they feel that their input is valued by the rest of the
board. This is consistent with Lipton and Lorsch’s (1992) argument that it may be di!cult to
15The regressions are qualitatively similar if I include only one role at a time.
17hold discussions in large boards. Older directors feel that their input is valued more by other
directors and directors in large ﬁrms feel that they receive more information, possibly because
managers of larger ﬁrms are subject to more scrutiny by the market.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Table 4 shows the results for Debate at the director level. Advisory Role is positively
correlated with all measures of debate, while Monitoring Role is positively correlated only with
Heated Discussion and Debate Index. Although the items in Debate concern board, rather
than individual director interaction, this suggests that the presence of directors who perceive
themselves to fulﬁll an advisory role is associated with greater levels of debate. Few of the
other variables are related to Debate, except for Number of Directorships and Director Age.
Number of Directorships is negatively related to Debate Index. Older directors perceive that
t h e r ei sl e s sd e b a t e .
(Insert Table 5 about here)
In Table 5, I analyze the relationship between Debate Index and the explanatory variables at
the ﬁrm level. To do this, I average Debate Index, survey responses and director characteristics
across all directors of the same ﬁrm. Because average Debate Index is no longer ordinal, I
analyze debate at the ﬁrm level using OLS with robust standard errors.
Table 5 shows a more balanced view of the role of monitoring and advising. Unlike in
the individual level data, the coe!cient on Monitoring Role is signiﬁcant in columns I and II
while the coe!cient on Advisory Role is positive but not signiﬁcant. It is possible that the
process of averaging may have eliminated much of the variation in Advisory Role. However,
it is also noticeable that in general fewer variables are signiﬁcantly related to Debate than to
Meaningful Communication. No other variable other than Ln(Assets) is signiﬁcantly related to
Debate Index in Table 5 and few variables other than directors’ roles are consistently related
to measures of debate in Table 4. One reason may be that other factors are important in
explaining Debate. Another reason is that there may be too little variation in Debate that can
be accounted for by variation in the explanatory variables. Because items in Debate referred
to the board rather than individual directors, directors’ responses to these items may have
18exhibited less variation than their responses concerning their own behavior.
Overall, the results from Tables 3-5 provide some evidence in support of arguments made
in the literature about the impact of board composition and structure on boardroom commu-
nication. Consistent with the idea that they are more experienced, directors with more board
seats appear to voice their views more than other directors. Number of Directorships does not
appear to matter much for other communication measures, probably because only few direc-
tors have more than one board seat. Consistent with the idea that it is more di!cult to have
discussions in large boards, Board Size appears to have a negative impact on Meaningful Com-
munication. The results also strongly suggest that directors’ perceptions of their roles aects
their perceptions of communication.
5.2. Factors aecting directors’ perceptions of their roles
Because there is variation in how directors perceive their roles, I examine factors that aect
their perceptions at the individual level in Tables 6 and 7. In particular, I am interested
whether directors’ perceived inﬂuence over decision-making and their independence aects their
role. As I argue in Section 3, communication between the board and management may be
more important when the board is in control, which may lead it to reduce its emphasis on
monitoring. The literature also assumes that independent director should monitor more, thus
I expect that directors who agree more strongly that they are friends with the CEO, and may
thus be considered less independent, are less likely to agree that they have a monitoring role.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
In Table 6 the dependent variable is Advisory Role. In Table 7, the dependent variable is
Monitoring Role. As explanatory variables I include the same explanatory variables I included in
Tables 3-5. It is plausible, for example, that more experienced directors may advise management
more. This suggests that Number of Directorships may inﬂuence a director’s perception of his
role. I also include the variables measuring director inﬂuence: CEO Decides, Board Decides and
Major Shareholder Decides, which I group under the term Inﬂuence. To avoid multicollinearity
19between these variables, I include only one of them at a time. I measure independence using
a set of variables I label as Friends, which consists of Friends with CEO, Friends with Major
Shareholder and Friends with Outsiders. Because the Chairman of the Board may have a
dierent role than other directors, I also include a dummy indicating chairman status. As
in Tables 3 and 4, I use ordered logit analysis and correct all standard errors for potential
heteroskedasticity and group correlation at the ﬁrm level. I also present each regression with
and without ﬁrm-level controls.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
The results in Tables 6 and 7 show several interesting patterns. As one might expect, when
directors perceive that the CEO has more control over decision-making, directors agree less
that they have an advisory role and more that they have a monitoring role. A similar pattern
holds for major shareholder control. But, when the board perceives itself to be more in control,
directors’ perceptions are the opposite. They agree more that they have an advisory role and
less that they have a monitoring role. This is consistent with the arguments in Section 3 that
directors may reduce their impact on monitoring when they are in control in favor of better
communication.
When directors agree more that they are friends with the CEO, they also agree more that
they have an advisory role. But, when they are friends with other directors, they agree less
that they have an advisory role. Friendship ties with the major shareholder have no eect on
directors’ perception of their advisory role, nor do friendship ties appear to signiﬁcantly aect
directors’ perceptions of their monitoring role. The coe!cient on Friends with CEO is negative
across all speciﬁcations in Table 7, as expected, but it is signiﬁcant in only one speciﬁcation.
Number of Directorships is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with Advisory Role. Directors
on larger boards agree less strongly that they have an advisory role, which is plausible if
individual directors are less likely to be consulted on a larger board. Finally, directors of larger
ﬁrms do not agree as strongly that they have an advisory role. A possible explanation for this
result is that larger ﬁrms are older and more established so that there is less need for CEOs to
consult directors than in younger ﬁrms.
20Chairmen appear to occupy a special position in that they agree more strongly that they
have an advisory role, but they also agree more strongly that they have a monitoring role.
Because they have more authority than other directors it is possible that they must both
ensure that the CEO is doing his job, but also act as a sounding board for the CEO. Otherwise,
the only variables that are signiﬁcantly related to Monitoring Role are the Inﬂuence variables.
Once Inﬂuence is accounted for, it appears that there is too little variation in director responses
concerning their monitoring role that can be accounted for by the factors I consider.
6. Problems with survey data
To a certain extent none of the results of the previous section are surprising. Both theory and
intuition suggest that advisors should talk more, experienced directors should be more engaged
and directors on larger boards will have less say in discussions. It is also intuitive that the
CEO is more likely to consult the board when the board has more power and that experienced
directors are more likely to advise the CEO, while directors on large boards are less likely to
advise the CEO. The ﬁnding that directors who consider themselves friends of the CEO also
agree more that they advise the CEO is also plausible. If the survey answers reﬂect actual
board practice, then this provides direct evidence that some factors the governance literature
traditionally considers important, such as board size and number of directorships, do inﬂuence
how directors govern. However, these results also highlight that having independent directors
who monitor may not be su!cient for good governance. Instead, personal connections between
directors and the CEO and directors who serve an advisory role may also be important.
However, as with any study of survey data, the results are less meaningful if the survey
answers are biased because respondents are systematically dierent from nonrespondents, if
the survey did not elicit meaningful responses or the answers merely reﬂect beliefs and not
practice.
Nonresponse bias is a concern if the directors who did not return the survey diered sys-
tematically from those who did. For example, the summary statistics in Table 1A show that
21older directors were more likely to answer the survey. Since age is also correlated with some
measures of communication and directors’ roles in Tables 3-7, it is possible that the results are
biased because respondents are older than nonrespondents. I address this concern in Section
6.1 by estimating Heckman selection regressions.
Another concern with survey data is that the survey questions do not elicit meaningful
responses either because respondents do not answer truthfully or because the questions were
not properly understood. While it is impossible to verify the accuracy of the responses, the
fact that the survey recipients were guaranteed anonymity should increase conﬁdence that their
responses are truthful. Since nearly all respondents completed the entire survey, I believe
that the likelihood the directors did not understand the survey is small. Nevertheless, as a
robustness check I deleted observations for which the director did not answer more than 75%
of questions (5 observations) or chose any answer (e.g. 3) more than 60% of the time (13
observations). Directors with missing answers may have been least likely to understand the
survey and directors who generally chose the same answer may have been less careful in their
responses. The results are qualitatively the same after this robustness check.
A ﬁnal concern is that the survey responses reﬂect belief but not practice. By asking direc-
tors to answer some questions in the context of a recent decision the board made, I attempted to
prevent this problem to some extent. I also conduct further analyses that serve as a robustness
check that the responses are meaningful. First, in Section 6.2, I examine the answers provided
by the CEO concerning board level discussion and the CEO’s use of directors as advisors and
his view of them as monitors to see whether the factors aecting them appear similar to those
aecting directors’ answers. If so, then it is plausible that the directors’ responses do pick
up useful information. Second, in Section 7, I relate a small subset of directors’ answers to
performance, as measured by ROA, at the ﬁrm level. If communication is valuable, ﬁrms in
which directors communicate more should perform better. If survey answers reﬂect practice,
then I expect survey answers that are positively correlated with measures of communication to
be positively related to performance.
226.1. Nonresponse bias
As Table 1 suggests there are several dierences between characteristics of survey respondents
and nonrespondents. Respondents are slightly older and have slightly more directorships. While
the dierences in characteristics are small, it is possible that the sample of respondents is
su!ciently dierent to bias the previous results. To address the problem of sample selection bias,
I estimate Heckman selection regressions for all previous regressions using maximum likelihood.
I begin with the director level regressions and then I turn to the ﬁrm level regressions in Table
5.
To correct for sample selection bias at the director level, I need to include a variable in my
selection equation that is highly correlated with the likelihood that a director responds to the
survey and that is not already included in my regressions. I use a dummy variable indicating
whether the CEO or the Chairman responded to the survey, because it is plausible that di-
rectors are more willing to respond to the survey if they realize that the CEO or Chairman
responded. In addition, this variable is unlikely to be an omitted variable from the previous
regressions. I also include all other individual director characteristics and Board Size in the
selection equation. For the sake of brevity, I report only the results for Meaningful Communi-
cation Index and Debate Index, not for the individual items. As before, I adjust all standard
errors for heteroskedasticity and group correlation at the ﬁrm level.16
(Insert Table 8 about here)
Column I of Table 8 shows the estimates of the selection equation. The dependent variable
is deﬁned to be one if a director responded to the survey. As the summary statistics suggest,
Number of Directorships and Age are positively correlated with the likelihood a director re-
sponds to the survey, while tenure is negatively correlated. Board Size has no eect. Most
importantly, directors were much more likely to respond to the survey if the CEO or Chair-
man responded to the survey. The coe!cient on the CEO or Chairman Responded dummy is
16I performed Heckman selection regressions for all components of the two indeces as well as the regressions
in Tables 6 and 7. According to the Wald test of independence of equations, I could not reject that the selection
and outcome equations are independent in almost all of these regressions. In the few cases where I could reject
independence, the pattern of signiﬁcance and signs of the coe!cients did not change much. Thus, there is little
evidence that selection is biasing the results.
23signiﬁcant at greater than the 1% level. Columns II and III show the results of estimating the
speciﬁcations in columns X of Tables 3 and 4, respectively, using Heckman selection regressions.
The results are very similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. The coe!cients are of the same sign
and similar signiﬁcance.
To correct the speciﬁcation in column II of Table 5 for sample selection bias at the ﬁrm
level, I need to include a variable in my selection equation that is highly correlated with the
likelihood that any director responded to the survey. I can no longer use the CEO or Chairman
Responded dummy, since it predicts that a ﬁrm has at least one director responding perfectly.
Instead, I use a variable I collected from the Swedish War Archives that indicates whether or
not directors in my sample were conscripted to serve in the military prior to 1969. Sweden has
a conscription army and most males are conscripted. For individuals conscripted prior to 1969
it is possible to hand collect data on their conscription status at the War Archives. My prior
was that serving in the military may increase an individual’s willingness to provide information
and respond to a survey. If so, I expect that at the ﬁrm level the fraction of directors who were
conscripted prior to 1969, Fraction Drafted (out of those old enough to be drafted), should be
correlated with the likelihood that at least one director responded to the survey.
Of the 780 sample directors that were old enough to be conscripted prior to 1969, 564
(72.1%) were drafted.17 At the ﬁrm level, this amounts to a fraction of 0.751 of directors who
were old enough. Column IV of Table 8 reports the results of the selection equation at the
ﬁrm level. In addition to Fraction Drafted, I include the same control variables as in column I
averaged at the ﬁrm level. Both Board Size and Fraction Drafted are positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the likelihood a ﬁrm has at least one respondent. The eect of Board Size is
plausible since the likelihood any director responds should increase in the number of directors.
The eect of Fraction Drafted is also consistent with intuition that individuals who served in
the military may be more willing to provide information about themselves. In column V, I
17I cannot use the conscription variable to address selection at the individual level because the conscription
information is missing for all directors who were not old enough to serve in the army prior to 1969, thus I lose a
large portion of my sample at the individual level. In contrast, most ﬁrms (251) have at least one director who
was old enough to serve in the army prior to 1969, thus the conscription data can help me achieve identiﬁcation
at the ﬁrm level.
24report the Heckman estimates of the speciﬁcation in column IV of Table 5. The results are very
similar, i.e. the coe!cient on Advisory Role and Monitoring Role are both positive, although
none are signiﬁcant.
At the bottom of columns II, III and V of Table 8, I report the p-value for the Wald test
of independence of equations in the Heckman selection model. The tests suggest that I cannot
reject that the selection and outcome equations are independent, thus there seems to be little
evidence that selection is biasing the results.
6.2. CEO responses
So far, I have relied exclusively on survey responses by directors. In this Section, I examine
CEO responses to see which factors are related to the CEOs’ perceptions of communication in
the boardroom and directors’ roles. If these factors are similar to those that aect director’s
perceptions, then this suggests that directors’ survey responses are informative in that they
may reﬂect not just beliefs, but also practice.
(Insert Table 9 about here)
In Table 9, I examine communication at the CEO level. As dependent variables, I include
only items that are relevant for CEOs. These include two items from Meaningful Communica-
tion and all items from Debate including a CEO Debate Index. I include the same explanatory
variables as in Tables 3 and 4, with two variations: First, Advisory Role-CEO and Monitor-
ing Role-CEO are the CEO’s responses to the statements “I often ask directors to provide
advice and counsel” and “The board spends more time evaluating management performance
than providing input into strategic decision-making”. Second, I include the average Number of
Directorships, Age and Tenure of directors, not CEOs, to compare the characteristics of direc-
tors that appear to aect directors’ perceptions of communication and those that aect CEOs’
perceptions. I use ordered logit regressions and adjust all standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
From column I, it is interesting to note that the coe!cient on Board Size is positive and
signiﬁcant. While the results from Table 3, columns III and IV suggest that directors may be
25less likely to voice their views the larger the board, CEOs are more likely to voice their views
o nl a r g e rb o a r d s .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hJ e n s e n ’ s( 1 9 9 3 )a r g u m e n tt h a tl a r g eb o a r d sa r em o r e
easily controlled by the CEO.
The results in column II are similar to the results for directors. CEOs value the inputs
of directors more the more they perceive that they ask directors for advice and the less they
perceive that the board serves primarily to evaluate management. CEOs are more likely to
perceive that directors propose dierent approaches the more they rely on directors for advice
(column III). But, they perceive that directors are more likely to propose dierent approaches
from themselves and the major shareholder (columns IV and V) if they perceive that the board
plays more of a monitoring role. Mean Number of Directorships of directors is also positively
related to CEOs’ perceptions that directors will suggest alternatives to them, which is somewhat
consistent with the ﬁrm level debate results in Table 5.
(Insert Table 10 about here)
In Table 10, I examine CEOs’ perceptions of the roles directors play using ordered logit
regressions. I use the same speciﬁcations as in Table 6 and 7 using survey responses of CEOs and
mean director characteristics. While almost no explanatory variable is signiﬁcant, the pattern of
signs on the Inﬂuence variables is the same as for directors. In addition, CEOs’ perceptions that
they are friends with outsiders is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with CEOs’ perceptions
that the board serves primarily as monitor, consistent with directors’ perceptions.
As a robustness check, I reran the regressions in Tables 9 and 10 after including a dummy
indicating Vice-CEO status. The results were essentially the same. The Vice-CEO dummy was
generally insigniﬁcant. However, Vice-CEOs were signiﬁcantly less likely to voice their views
in discussions in the regression in column I of Table 9 and were also signiﬁcantly less likely to
ask directors for advice in the regressions in columns I-III of Table 10. Because it is plausible
that Vice-CEOs have less power than CEOs, these results suggest that the CEO responses may
contain some useful information.
In general, CEOs’ responses appear less informative than directors’ responses, perhaps be-
cause the sample is much smaller. However, the relationship between CEO’s perceptions of
26directors’ roles and communication is similar to that of directors’ perceptions, which suggests
that director responses may reﬂect not simply beliefs, but also practice.
7. Firm performance and factors correlated with commu-
nication
While some of the previous results conﬁrm well-accepted ideas that board size and, to a slightly
lesser degree, number of directorships inﬂuence how directors govern, they also suggest that
sta!ng a board with independent directors who monitor may not be su!cient for good gov-
ernance. If communication is important for governance, directors who may not be completely
independent and who play an advisory role on the board may also be important. Because this
contradicts the popular idea that independent directors are always better, I examine the value
of advisors and friends of the CEO in more detail in this Section. To do this I ﬁrst examine
the relationship between ﬁrm performance, as measured by ROA, and advice. Next, I examine
the relationship between ﬁrm performance and the friendliness of the board with the CEO.
The latter can be considered to be reduced form regressions since Friends with CEO is highly
correlated with directors’ perceptions that they have an advisory role. Moreover, such regres-
sions are useful to compare to previous results from the governance literature since they are
similar to regressions in which ﬁrm performance is regressed on measures of board independence
(e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2000), except that I examine board
dependence instead of board independence.
One concern in this analysis is that there may be reverse causality between performance and
advice and board friendliness. If performance is low, it is plausible that directors perceive that
they advise the CEO more. On the other hand, if performance is high, they may feel friendlier
towards the CEO. To address this problem, I need instruments that are correlated with advice
and board friendliness but uncorrelated with performance except through variables already
included in the regression. It is di!cult to identify an instrument in this context because most
27variables that are plausibly correlated with Advisory Role or Friends with CEO, such as board
size, are also plausibly correlated with performance. Thus, I use the following trick. I convert
Advisory Role and Friends with CEO into board level variables by deﬁning an advisor (friend)
to be a director with a score greater than three on Advisory Role (Friends with CEO). I then
compute the board level number of advisors and number of friends of the CEO that responded
to the survey. On average boards have 1.3 advisors and 1.04 friends with a minimum of 0 and
a maximum of 5 for both variables.
I now take as my instrument for advice, as measured by the number of advisors, as well
as for board friendliness, as measured by the number of friends of the CEO, the number of
survey respondents on the board. I argue that the number of respondents may be a reasonable
candidate for an instrument. By construction, the number of respondents should be correlated
both with the number of advisors and the number of friends; since the more respondents
there are the more likely a director will be classiﬁed as an advisor and/or a friend. It is
also plausible that the number of respondents is uncorrelated with ﬁrm performance. As the
summary statistics in Table 1B suggest, performance is not correlated with the likelihood of
response. If I include performance in the selection equation in column I of Table 8, performance
does not enter signiﬁcantly. While this does not prove that performance is uncorrelated with
the number of respondents, it is at least suggestive. To address the fact that performance
may nevertheless have an eect on the number of respondents, I include lagged ROA in my
performance regressions and I also examine variables that are standardized by the number of
respondents,18 i.e. Fraction of Respondents Who Are Advisors and Fraction of Respondents
Who are Friends of CEO.19
(Insert Table 11 about here)
Columns I-IV of Table 11 show the results of instrumental variable regressions of ROA on
Number of Advisors, Fraction of Respondents Who Are Advisors, Number Friends of CEO and
18The number of respondents is not signiﬁcantly correlated with Advisory Role, Friends With CEO or indi-
vidual communication items, thus I am limited in the IV performance regressions I can estimate. Unfortunately,
I am unable to determine the direct eect of communication on performance.
19The average values of Fraction of Respondents Who Are Advisors and Fraction of Respondents Who Are
Friends of The CEO are 50.44% and 37.75%, respectively.
28Fraction of Respondents Who Are Friends of CEO, respectively. I restrict the sample of ﬁrms
to those with at least one respondent and correct all standard errors for heteroskedasticity. As
control variables I include director characteristics averaged at the ﬁrm level and the same ﬁrm
level controls as before, as well as one period lagged ROA. At the bottom of Table 11, I report
the coe!cient on the instrument and its t-statistics from the ﬁrst stage regression.
As expected, the coe!cient on the number of respondents in the ﬁrst stage for Number of
Advisors and Number Friends of CEO is positive and signiﬁcant. In addition, it is positive and
signiﬁcant for Fraction of Respondents Who Are Advisors and Fraction of Respondents Who
Are Friends of CEO.
In the performance regressions, the signs of the controls are consistent with other perfor-
mance regressions in the governance literature. For example, the sign on Board Size is con-
sistently negative and signiﬁcant. Mean Number of Directorships is generally positive but not
signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the results in Ferris Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003). The
coe!cient on Number of Advisors is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Similarly, the co-
e!cient on Number Friends of CEO is positive and signiﬁcant. While no longer as signiﬁcant,
the coe!cients on Fraction of Respondents Who Are Advisors and Fraction of Respondents
Who Are Friends of CEO are also positive. These results thus substantiate what the previous
tables suggest, namely that advisors and personal relationships may have value. The results in
Tables 3-7 suggest that the channel through which they add value is communication. Directors
who have better personal relationships with management may communicate dierently which
may increase board eectiveness. Of course, there may also be disadvantages to having direc-
tors who are friends of the CEO on the board because personal relationships can interfere with
the board’s monitoring function. This suggests that the relationship between performance and
Number of Advisors and Number Friends of CEO should be nonlinear. Unfortunately, I cannot
detect a nonlinear relationship in my data because the proportion of board members who I can
classify as advisors or friends of the CEO is too small.20 It would be interesting to explore such
20On average 31.69% of directors responded. The average fraction of directors I can classify as advisors
(friends of the CEO) is 16.94% (13.07%).
29a nonlinear relationship in further research.
8. Conclusion
There are many theories about eective boards. There are also many governance standards
prescribing what boards should look like. However, as the quote at the beginning of this paper
points out, directing involves behavior that is not easily measurable for outside observers. In
this paper, I use survey data in an attempt to quantify one aspect of director behavior, com-
munication, in order to examine whether governance characteristics the literature is concerned
with inﬂuence behavior in ways the literature predicts. I ﬁnd evidence that some factors the
literature traditionally predicts should be related to communication are indeed related. For ex-
ample, board size appears to impact communication negatively, in ways that are consistent both
with free-riding behavior and the di!culties of holding discussions in larger groups. Directors
on larger boards perceive that they participate less in discussions and feel that their inputs are
less valued than directors on smaller boards. On the other hand, directors who consider their
role to consist primarily in monitoring do not feel that they participate in discussions as much
as other directors, nor is there a strong relationship between monitoring and the likelihood the
board proposes dierent approaches to the CEO. While the weak relationship between moni-
toring and communication may be the result of insu!cient variation in the data, the results are
also consistent with descriptions of boards as primarily passive, except in exceptional situations
(see e.g. Mace, 1986, and Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Thus, they raise doubts that increasing
the monitoring strength of the board will necessarily lead directors to question management, as
governance standards often implicitly assume. Instead, the results suggest that directors who
fulﬁll an advisory role on the board may also be important. Perhaps one of the more interesting
ﬁndings is that directors who act in an advisory role do not appear to mere “rubberstamps”.
Instead, directors’ perceptions of their advisory role are positively correlated with measures
of debate, which is a form of questioning management. Since directors with better personal
relationships with management are more likely to have an advisory role, the results suggest
30that allowing some dependence between directors and managers may be value-enhancing.
I believe that the results in this paper suggest that survey-based research of directors may
eectively complement research using publicly-available data. The survey data in this paper
provides some insight into boardroom behavior. It also raises further questions. For example,
since few of the factors I investigate are related to directors’ perceptions of their monitoring role,
it would also be interesting to investigate other possible determinants of monitoring. Clearly,
we have much more to learn about director behavior. Thus, survey data can be useful to inform
future research on board eectiveness. Although survey data also has its problems, with an
appropriate sample, as in this paper, it is possible to address some of the problems, such as
potential nonresponse bias, using Heckman selection techniques.
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4Table 1A: Summary statistics for survey respondents and nonrespondents 
This table contains summary statistics of characteristics of all resident directors (1,372 
individuals) and CEOs (424 individuals) of all publicly-traded firms in Sweden (286 
firms) in 2005. The top panel of Panel A contains summary statistics for all survey 
respondents. The bottom panel contains statistics for all nonrespondents. Panel B 
contains the same statistics for the director sample only. Number of directorships is the 
number of directorships a director holds in all publicly-traded firms including the firm the 
director was surveyed for. The differences in director characteristics between respondents 
and nonrespondents are all significant at the 1% level. 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Panel A 
Survey respondents-full sample 
Number directorships   628  1.354  0.852  1  7 
Age   628  53.282  9.155  24  73 
Tenure 628  2.616  2.209  0  9 
CEO dummy   628  0.201  0.401  0  1 
Survey nonrespondents-full sample 
Number directorships   1168  1.254  0.729  1  7 
Age   1168  51.416  9.163  24  80 
Tenure 1168  2.807  2.296  0  9 
CEO dummy   1168  0.255  0.436  0  1 
Panel B 
Survey respondents-directors 
Number directorships   502  1.361  0.838  1  7 
Age   502  54.203  9.405  24  73 
Tenure 502  2.677  2.264  0  9 
Survey nonrespondents-directors 
Number directorships   870  1.243  0.687  1  6 
Age   870  52.024  9.787  24  80 
Tenure 870  2.823  2.331  0  9 Table 1B: Summary statistics of firm characteristics with and without respondents 
This table contains summary statistics of financial characteristics of all publicly-traded firms in Sweden in 2005. The top 
panel contains summary statistics for firms with at least one survey respondent. The bottom panel contains statistics for 
firms with no respondent. ROA is net income divided by book value of assets. Fraction respondents is the fraction of a 
firm’s directors who responded to the survey. CEO response dummy is defined to be 1 if the CEO responded to the survey. 
Observations vary because of missing balance sheet information. The differences in characteristics between firms with and 
without respondents are all insignificant except for those for board size and ln(assets) which are significant at the 5% level.
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Firms with at least one respondent 
Board  size  250  8.172  2.499 3.000 15.000 
Assets 241  5.95E+09  2.00E+10 2250000  2.16E+11 
Ln(Assets) 241  20.291  2.105  14.626  26.098 
Leverage 240  0.773  1.142  -10.000  4.700 
ROA 241  -0.021  0.161  -1.233  0.362 
Fraction respondents  250  0.404  0.183  0.100  1.000 
Number respondents  250  2.512  1.380  1.000  8.000 
CEO response dummy  250  0.464  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Firms with no respondent 
Board size  36  7.111  2.516  3  14 
Assets 33  1.61E+09  4.33E+09 4371000  2.17E+10 
Ln(Assets) 33  19.417  1.806  15.291  23.802 
Leverage 32  0.681  0.868  0  3.3 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Debate and directors’ roles-Firm level analysis
This table shows the results of OLS regressions of firm level averages 
of directors’ survey responses in the sample of firms with at least one 
respondent. The dependent variable is the firm level average of “Debate 
Index”, which is the director level sum of the items in “Debate”. All 
survey responses and director characteristics are the firm level averages 
of the corresponding director level variables. Remaining variables are 
as in Table 1. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Observations vary because of missing data. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Debate  Index 
 I  II 
Mean Advisory role  0.253 0.164 
[1.02] [0.64] 
Mean Monitoring role  0.602* 0.609* 
[1.94] [1.94] 
Mean Number directorships  -0.358 -0.055 
[0.55] [0.08] 
Board size  -0.135 0.006 
[1.12] [0.04] 
Mean Age  -0.078 -0.079 
[1.22] [1.23] 
Mean Tenure  -0.315* -0.267 
[1.67] [1.36] 
Ln(Assets)   -0.327 
 [1.52] 
Leverage   0.111 
 [0.56] 
Constant  17.954*** 23.250*** 
[5.14] [4.74] 
Observations  225 216 
R-squared  0.059 0.08 Table 6: Factors related to directors’ advisory role 
This table shows the results of ordinal logit regressions in the sample of directors’ survey responses. The dependent 
variable is “Advisory role”. All variables based on survey responses are defined in Table 2. Chairman is a dummy 
variable which is one if the director is the chairman of the board. Remaining variables are as in Table 1. All standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and group correlation at the firm level. Observations vary because of 
missing data. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Advisory  role 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
CEO decides  -0.219***  -0.230***      
[3.26]  [3.13]      
Board decides     0.291***  0.255***    
   [3.87]  [3.28]    
Major shareholder decides       -0.171***  -0.118* 
     [2.91]  [1.87] 
Friends with CEO  0.601*** 0.594*** 0.584*** 0.564*** 0.524*** 0.516*** 
[7.63] [6.86] [7.27] [6.34] [6.36] [5.68] 
Friends with Major 
shareholder  0.056 0.029 0.078 0.052  0.130*  0.088 
[0.82] [0.40] [1.17] [0.74] [1.85] [1.20] 
Friends with outsiders  -0.304*** -0.302*** -0.326*** -0.308*** -0.286*** -0.274*** 
[3.48] [3.23] [3.70] [3.26] [3.28] [2.93] 
Number directorships  0.232** 0.225* 0.267**  0.264**  0.244** 0.244* 
[2.11] [1.82] [2.45] [2.14] [2.21] [1.91] 
Board size  -0.180*** -0.101** -0.192*** -0.112** -0.176*** -0.107** 
[4.58] [2.06] [4.99] [2.34] [4.55] [2.21] 
Age 0.029*** 0.019* 0.030*** 0.020* 0.030*** 0.021* 
[2.76] [1.79] [2.73] [1.85] [2.88] [1.95] 
Tenure -0.036 -0.014 -0.022 -0.001 -0.019 0.003 
[0.96] [0.36] [0.58] [0.02] [0.50] [0.09] 
chairman   1.703***  1.657***  1.617*** 
 [5.89]  [5.73]  [5.51] 
Ln(Assets)    -0.099   -0.101*   -0.089 
 [1.63]  [1.65]  [1.49] 
Leverage   0.063  0.066  0.062 
 [0.92]  [0.96]  [0.92] 
Observations 491  466  491  466  490  465 Table 7: Factors related to directors’ monitoring role 
This table shows the results of ordinal logit regressions in the sample of directors’ survey responses. The dependent variable 
is “Monitoring role”. All variables based on survey responses are defined in Table 2. Chairman is a dummy variable which is 
one if the director is the chairman of the board. Remaining variables are as in Table 1. All standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and group correlation at the firm level. Observations vary because of missing data. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Monitoring  role 
I II  III  IV  V  VI 
CEO decides  0.242***  0.291***      
[3.95]  [4.63]      
Board decides     -0.235**  -0.259***    
   [2.57]  [2.76]    
Major shareholder decides       0.116**  0.166*** 
     [2.24]  [3.02] 
Friends with CEO  -0.09 -0.141*  -0.063 -0.098 -0.018 -0.043 
[1.14] [1.71] [0.82] [1.23] [0.23] [0.53] 
Friends with Major shareholder  0.057 0.059 0.039 0.036 -0.004  -0.023 
[0.90] [0.94] [0.63] [0.58] [0.06] [0.38] 
Friends with outsiders  0.076 0.108 0.071 0.094 0.052 0.075 
[1.01] [1.38] [0.96] [1.21] [0.70] [0.94] 
Number directorships  -0.052 -0.08  -0.09 -0.126 -0.08 -0.096 
[0.52] [0.75] [0.88] [1.14] [0.75] [0.83] 
Board size  0.044 0.042 0.054 0.061 0.041 0.056 
[1.22] [0.86] [1.50] [1.23] [1.16] [1.13] 
Age 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.001 
[0.65] [0.46] [0.60] [0.39] [0.19] [0.11] 
Tenure 0.033 0.018 0.014 -0.003 0.018 0.001 
[0.83] [0.45] [0.37] [0.07] [0.46] [0.02] 
chairman   0.542**  0.521**   0.606*** 
 [2.34]  [2.26]  [2.60] 
Ln(Assets)   0.027  0.016   0 
 [0.47]  [0.29]  [0.01] 
Leverage   0.078  0.068  0.075 
 [1.62]  [1.28]  [1.44] 
Observations  490  465 490 465 489 464 Table 8: Heckman selection regressions 
This table shows the result of Heckman selection regressions of a subset of the specifications in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Columns II
and III show the results of the Heckman selection regressions of the director level specifications in columns X of Tables 3 
and 4, respectively. Column I shows the results of the corresponding selection equation in the director level survey response 
data. The main instrument in Column I is “CEO or Chairman responded”, which is a dummy equal to one if the CEO or 
Chairman responded to the survey. Column V shows the results of the Heckman selection regressions of the firm level 
specification in column II of Table 5. Column IV shows the results of the corresponding selection equation in the firm level 
data. The main instrument in Column IV is “Fraction drafted”, which is the fraction of directors drafted out of directors who 
were old enough to be drafted. Data for “Fraction drafted” come from the Swedish War Archives. All director characteristics 
enter the regressions in columns IV and V as firm level averages. The last row of Table 8 reports the p-value for the Wald test
of the independence of the selection and outcome equations. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
standard errors in columns I-III are corrected for group correlation at the firm level. Observations vary because of missing 











 I  II  III  IV  V 
Advisory role    1.112***  0.419*** 0.169 
   [11.41]  [2.74] [0.63] 
Monitoring role    -0.330***  0.308 0.541 
   [3.00]  [1.58] [1.55] 
CEO or Chairman responded  0.326***   
 [3.43]   
Fraction drafted       0.683***   
      [4.67]   
Number directorships  0.079**  0.251*  -0.299 -0.094*  -0.139 
 [2.30]  [1.73]  [1.01] [1.71]  [0.21] 
Board size  0.006  -0.174***  0.036 0.098***  0.091 
 [0.33]  [2.82]  [0.24] [6.06]  [0.48] 
Age 0.021***  0.028*  -0.016 -0.007  0.021 
 [6.26]  [1.88]  [0.49] [0.97]  [0.28] 
Tenure -0.046***  -0.025  -0.124 0.036  -0.389* 
 [3.06]  [0.46]  [1.10] [1.20]  [1.95] 
Ln(Assets)   0.024  -0.348*   -0.333 
   [0.30]  [1.90]   [1.45] 
Leverage   -0.111  0.259 0.117 
   [0.98]  [1.55] [0.60] 
Constant -1.816***  14.987***  17.435*** 0.341 17.948*** 
 [7.06]  [8.25]  [4.54] [0.86]  [3.20] 
Observations 1640  1640  1638  222  222 
Sample type  Directors   Directors  Directors  Firm level  Firm level 
Selection equation?  For 
columns II 
and III 
no no  For  column 
V
no
P-value for Wald test of independent 
equations 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 10: CEO responses concerning directors’ roles 
This table shows the results of ordinal logit regressions in the sample of CEOs’ survey responses. The dependent 
variable in columns I-III is “Advisory role-CEO”. The dependent variable in columns IV-VII is “Monitoring role-
CEO”. All variables based on survey responses are defined in Table 2, panel B. Remaining variables are as in Table 
1. All director characteristics enter the regressions as firm level averages. All standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Advisory role-CEO  Monitoring role-CEO 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
I decide  -0.223      0.157     
  [1.32]     [1.01]    
Board decides-CEO    0.137      -0.005   
   [1.04]      [0.04]   
Major shareholder decides-CEO      -0.032      0.097 
     [0.22]      [0.81] 
Friends with outsiders-CEO  0.158  0.16  0.151  -0.318*  -0.321*  -0.288 
 [1.04]  [1.03]  [0.95]  [1.85]  [1.83]  [1.59] 
Friends with Major shareholder-
CEO
0.099 0.107  0.115  0.045  0.046  -0.001 
 [0.71]  [0.76]  [0.75]  [0.31]  [0.32]  [0.01] 
Mean Number directorships of 
directors
-0.186 -0.13  -0.126  0.393  0.355  0.398 
 [0.33]  [0.23]  [0.23]  [0.86]  [0.79]  [0.92] 
Board size  -0.075  -0.074  -0.078  0.03  0.026  0.035 
 [0.65]  [0.68]  [0.72]  [0.25]  [0.23]  [0.31] 
Mean Age of directors  -0.05  -0.054  -0.062  0.018  0.021  0.024 
 [1.27]  [1.38]  [1.60]  [0.41]  [0.48]  [0.54] 
Mean Tenure of directors  0.093  0.103 0.119  0  -0.005  -0.009 
 [0.67]  [0.74]  [0.87]  [0.00]  [0.04]  [0.07] 
Ln(Assets) 0.098  0.085  0.099  -0.148  -0.149  -0.165 
 [0.78]  [0.68]  [0.77]  [1.10]  [1.10]  [1.26] 
Leverage -0.261**  -0.226*  -0.212* -0.038  -0.056 -0.087 
 [2.17]  [1.93]  [1.65]  [0.18]  [0.27]  [0.41] 
Observations 115  115  115  115  115  115 Table 11: Roles, social ties and performance-IV regressions in firm level data 
This table shows the results of IV regressions of ROA on measures of advice and board friendliness for firms 
which had at least one respondent. I define an advisor (friend of the CEO) to be a director with a score greater 
than three on the item “Advisory role” (“Friends with CEO”). Number of advisors (friends of CEO) is the firm 
level sum of advisors (friend of CEO). All director characteristics enter the regressions as firm level averages. 
All other variables are as in Table 1. The instrument in all regressions is the number of survey respondents per 
firm. The coefficient and t-statistic for the instrument in the first-stage regression is reported at the bottom of 
the table. The number of observations across all columns is 234. All standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
ROA
 I  II  III  IV 
Number advisors  0.023**       
 [2.13]       
Fraction of respondents who are advisors    0.423     
   [1.33]     
Number friends of CEO      0.025**   
     [2.14]   
Fraction of respondents who are friends of CEO        0.279* 
    [ 1 . 6 7 ]  
Board size -0.016*** -0.014** -0.017***  -0.019*** 
[3.28] [2.12] [3.21] [2.71] 
Mean Number directorships  0.006 -0.018 0.013 0.022 
[0.42] [0.58] [0.88] [1.08] 
Mean Age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
[0.69] [0.30] [0.63] [0.64] 
Mean Tenure  -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 
[0.59] [0.41] [0.83] [1.16] 
Ln(Assets)  0.047*** 0.064*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 
[4.53] [3.43] [4.41] [4.11] 
Leverage  -0.013 -0.025 -0.012 -0.012 
[0.94] [1.16] [0.86] [0.81] 
ROA in 2004  0.073*** 0.085** 0.069*** 0.063** 
[2.86] [2.52] [2.75] [1.98] 
Constant  -0.815*** -1.331*** -0.791*** -0.910*** 
[4.07] [2.63] [4.01] [3.78] 
Coefficient and t-statistics on instrument in first stage  0.585*** 0.032* 0.536***  0.049*** 
[11.71] [1.73] [11.04] [2.77]  SIFR Research Report Series
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